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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the common notions of negotiable instruments 
as they relate to the modern day promissory note in the context of residen-
tial mortgage lending. The Article further addresses the destruction of the 
negotiability of such promissory notes through various undertakings added 
for the benefit of the banking industry, often to the detriment of a borrower. 
The use of negotiable instruments commenced in the 1800s in England as 
a way of ensuring a fluid market between trades as there was no fiat cur-
rency system in place. The fundamental purpose behind the concept of 
negotiability was subsequently abrogated by the modernization of the 
financial industry, and the creation of a global marketplace for the pur-
chase and sale of promissory notes. Furthermore, the Article discusses 
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how the holder in due course doctrine, which limits a borrower’s defenses 
when a promissory note has been transferred from one note holder to 
another, has created significant abuse to consumers by the financial in-
dustry. The abuse of consumers through the holder in due course doctrine 
remains a problem unchecked by many courts that continue to apply nego-
tiability law to modern day promissory notes in real estate mortgage 
transactions despite the fact that modern day promissory notes lack any of 
the tenets of “negotiability” under article 3 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The Article then calls on the judiciary, as theoretically the least politi-
cal and most impartial branch of government, to find that such promissory 
notes are no longer negotiable instruments, and therefore must be trans-
ferred via assignment pursuant to article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. Such a new construct or approach  would provide the transparency 
necessary to protect consumers and preserve defenses to predatory lend-
ing by the financial industry. 
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INTRODUCTION: “THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES” 
In Hans Christian Andersen’s folk story “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” 
an arrogant Emperor hires two swindlers that promise him the finest suit 
from the best fabric, which is invisible to anyone who is either unfit for his 
position or unusually stupid.1 The Emperor and his ministers cannot see 
the cloth themselves, but they pretend that they can because they are too 
afraid to admit that they are stupid or unfit for their position.2 When the 
swindlers report that the suit is finished, they mime dressing the Emperor, 
who then marches before the people of the great city where he lives.3 All 
of the citizens play along with the sham until a child in the crowd blurts out 
that the Emperor is wearing nothing at all, and the cry is soon taken up by the 
whole city.4 
Just as in the fable, the judicial system and housing-mortgage market 
have been improperly led to believe that mortgage promissory notes, par-
ticularly the standard note form approved by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), are negotiable.5 Yet, rather than acknowledging that the nego-
tiability of this standard form note (which represents trillions of dollars in 
commercial paper) has been destroyed by the addition of various terms and 
contingencies, the judicial system and the housing-mortgage market, like 
the emperor and his ministers, have turned a blind eye to what is obvious to 
everyone else.6 
In fact, the very formation of article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) was nothing more than a strategic plan by lenders and the American 
                                                                                                                         
1 HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES (Harcourt Brace 1998) 
(1837). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Roy Oppenheim, Banks fear courts’ ruling on negotiability of promissory notes, S. 
FLA. L. BLOG (May 28, 2013), http://southfloridalawblog.com/banks-fear-courts-rulings-on 
-promissory-notes/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZC3K-MNVY. 
6 Id. In fact, the Illinois Bankers Association all but begged the Illinois Supreme Court 
to find the standard mortgage note negotiable, citing the “major practical and public policy 
consequences” that any determination of the negotiability of these notes will have, in-
cluding “consequences reaching far beyond the court room and defendants in foreclosure 
actions.” Letter from Bruce Jay Baker, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, 
Illinois Bankers Association, to Honorable Members of the Mortgage Foreclosure Committee 
(Apr. 13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/9UC2-4KLW. In light of the possible rami-
fications of finding the standard note nonnegotiable, rather than asking the Illinois Supreme 
Court to apply the law, the IBA instead “respectfully urge[d] the Committee (and the Court) 
to keep sight of the broader consequences of any decisions it may make in the course of 
its deliberations.” Id. 
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Bankers’ Association to destroy the limited traditional requirements of 
negotiability that originated in the 1700s in England, while preserving the 
“better than” position given to a holder in due course which undermined any 
consumer protections that might have existed in the original form of prom-
issory notes.7 Other notable scholars on this topic have opined that the term 
“Uniform Commercial Code” is a misnomer, for it should have been called 
“‘the Lawyers and Bankers Relief Act.’”8 
Since the adoption of article 3 of the UCC, few courts have considered 
whether mortgage promissory notes are in fact truly “negotiable instruments” 
under the still somewhat narrow definition of “negotiability” contained in 
article 3.9 Instead, courts have presumed their negotiability, leading to the 
mantra by respected law professor and legal scholar Albert J. Rosenthal that 
“a negotiable instrument is a negotiable instrument is a negotiable instru-
ment. And a holder in due course is a holder in due course is a holder in due 
course.”10 Courts and judicial officers, like the emperor and his ministers, 
fear that truly examining the legal fiction of mortgage promissory notes could 
only lead to the conclusion that they are not negotiable, thus potentially de-
stroying the negotiability of trillions of dollars in commercial paper. So 
they turn a blind eye, ignore the application of law, and instead enforce folk-
lore that is perpetuated over and over again, and hope that maybe someone 
else, like the child in the crowd, is brave enough to blurt out what needs to 
be said: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac notes are nonnegotiable. 
This Article focuses on the history of negotiability, the changes thereto 
by the modernization and capitalization of our economy, and the changes 
to negotiability that have been promulgated by the financial industry. Part II 
of this Article further addresses how such changes were created in order to 
promote a lending tool that simultaneously allows lenders to transfer com-
mercial paper without accountability or traceability, while preventing unso-
phisticated consumers from bringing defenses against any purchaser in the 
secondary market for fraud and misrepresentations by the initial lenders.11 
Part IV of this Article further calls on the judiciary to examine the ar-
chaic and anarchic system that has developed out of article 3 of the UCC, 
which no longer has practical application in today’s commercial lending. 
                                                                                                                         
7 Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent 
in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 422 (2002). 
8 Id. 
9 This Article does not suggest that promissory notes are not “transferrable” through 
other methods, such as by assignment under article 9 of the UCC. Rather, this Article focuses 
solely on how mortgage promissory notes are not “negotiable” under the requirements of 
article 3 of the UCC. 
10 Albert J. Rosenthal, Note, NegotiabilityņWho Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 
375 (1971). 
11 See infra notes 104í201 and accompanying text.  
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Finally, this Article implores the judiciary to apply the law as it stands, 
rather than continuing to perpetuate the legal fiction of negotiability that 
has been ingrained in our judicial system because of public policy concerns 
and potential “broader consequences” of any decision which refuses to turn a 
blind eye to the failure of negotiability in mortgage promissory notes.12 
The authors of this Article ask the judiciary, as an impartial and nonpoliti-
cal branch of government, to open its eyes, and like the child, speak the naked 
truth. Further, the authors will provide a pathway that will allow notes to 
flow freely with transparency, and thus not cause a decline in the liquidity 
of the transfer of notes backed by mortgages as security, while still pre-
serving the rights of borrowers and the original intent of negotiability.13 
I. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
A. A History of Negotiable Instruments 
Negotiable instruments were most relevant in small-scale seventeenth 
and eighteenth century transactions.14 An example of early negotiability 
might involve parties such as “Miner,” who sold iron ore to “Blacksmith,” 
who then sold his goods to “Customer” at market. In a world without ne-
gotiable instruments, if Blacksmith did not have the funds to purchase ore 
from Miner, Blacksmith would have to obtain money to pay Miner before 
purchasing the ore, an often-difficult task in a country without a paper 
currency system. However, negotiable instruments provided a much more 
efficient structure where in exchange for the ore, Blacksmith would provide 
Miner with some instrument promising payment to Miner. Subsequently, 
Miner could collect the payment from Blacksmith, sell the instrument to 
another party, or use the instrument to pay for other goods. 
The chief advantage of employing negotiable instruments in this type 
of transaction is that they have the effect of increasing the liquidity of pay-
ment by making goods easier to sell.15 Negotiability enhances commerce 
by centralizing all rights in the underlying asset (a right of payment in this 
context) in a single physical document.16 Negotiability in this context 
                                                                                                                         
12 See infra notes 242í50 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 249í50 and accompanying text. 
14 See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 951, 956 (1997) (citing JAMES STEVEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE 
LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL 
LAW 94í124 (1995)). 
15 GERALD P. O’DRISCOLL, JR. & MARIO J. RIZZO, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND 
IGNORANCE 194 (1996) (“Liquidity provides economic agents with flexibility, flexibility 
that lowers cost.”). 
16 See id. 
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benefited all parties involved in a transaction because each party knew one 
another and understood the fiscal saliency of the parties involved.17 In 
these simple face-to-face transactions, negotiable instruments greatly en-
hanced the ease of commerce.18 
Yet, the codification of the UCC into statutory form has since been 
lamented by many due to the abundant opportunity for fraud and abuse by 
makers of promissory notes.19 In fact, Grant Gilmore, one of the drafters of 
the original form of the UCC, came to rue the codification of these archaic 
laws, stating that article 3 of the UCC was “a museum of antiquities—a treas-
ure house crammed full of ancient artifacts whose use and function have 
long since been forgotten.”20 
The promissory note, a unique form of negotiable instrument, was first 
used by merchants in England in the 1700s.21 In the first case to examine 
the legality of said notes, which were not yet considered legal tender in 
1756 England, Lord Mansfield upheld form over intent, such that the in-
terests of the free market were held above the rights of the maker of the 
note, even in such a case in which the note was stolen and then sold to a 
bona fide purchaser.22 In that way, negotiable instruments were used in 
lieu of a fiat currency system to promote free trade between merchants.23 
While the promissory note has changed little since the seventeenth cen-
tury, the world currency systems have grown by leaps and bounds, destroying 
the need for traditional promissory notes. Today’s promissory note “is quite a 
different instrument, serving different purposes, and the consequences of 
its negotiability are quite different in impact.”24 Today,  the most common 
                                                                                                                         
17 John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 579, 580 (1993) (stating “merchants knew the signatures of other 
merchants, knowledge that was essential to the circulation of the payments system’s paper”). 
18 Id. The use of negotiable instruments also became more prevalent as trade in-
creased between Europe and the colonies in America, and the civil notary public acted as 
both a witness to such documents, as well as a mediator if any such negotiable instrument 
was dishonored upon presentment or demand. Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: 
The Latin Notary, a Historical and Comparative Model, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 389, 427 (1996). Thus, the use of negotiable instruments is more closely tied to coun-
tries that currently use a civil law system than those which utilize a common law system 
like the United States. Id. The history of the negotiable instrument therefore strongly 
suggests that promissory notes could, and should, be “adjudicated” outside the common 
law judicial system for the purposes of effectuating commerce. 
19 Eggert, supra note 7, at 365í66. 
20 Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 441, 460í61 (1979). 
21 Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 377í78. 
22 Miller v. Race, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B.) 402. 
23 See id. 
24 Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 378. 
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use of promissory notes is by purchasers of real property for any unpaid 
amount due on the purchase price.25 However, due to the vast growth of tech-
nology, promissory notes are now traded in large bundles on a whim be-
tween lenders, making them no better than glorified baseball cards being 
traded in international markets.26 
In today’s society, our modern technological advancements can process 
an infinite number of transactions in a matter of moments, on a global scale.27 
As such, the existence of a tangible negotiable document does not aid parties 
to a transaction in simplifying or streamlining their business dealings.28 
Our culture has outgrown the benefits that negotiability once provided.29 The 
result has been a staggering increase in lenders promulgating instruments, 
which they claim are negotiable, but which are absolutely nonnegotiable 
under applicable law, as discussed in more detail below.30 The globalization 
of the economy has removed the personal interaction between a maker and 
a note holder as originally intended when the doctrine of negotiable in-
struments arose in seventeenth-century England, and has made the negoti-
ation of promissory notes an area of commerce that is rampant with fraud 
and other consumer abuse at the hands of financial institutions.31 
B. What Is a “Negotiable Instrument?” 
UCC section 3-104(a) provides the statutory definition of a negotiable 
instrument, stating that an instrument is negotiable if it is “an unconditional 
promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or 
other charges described in the promise or order.”32 
In addition, the instrument must also meet the three following prereq-
uisites. First, the instrument must be “payable to bearer or to order at the time 
it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder.”33 Second, the instru-
ment must be “payable on demand or at a definite time.”34 Third, the in-
strument must not “state any other undertaking or instruction by the person 
                                                                                                                         
25 See Oppenheim, supra note 5. 
26 DAVID P. TWOMEY & MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, ANDERSON’S BUSINESS LAW AND THE 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT STANDARD VOLUME 602 (22d ed. 2013). 
27 Global Presence, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/about-visa/our-business/global-presence 
.jsp (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BB5V-K9BW. 
28 Dolan, supra note 17, at 591í92; see also Mann, supra note 14, at 986í90. 
29 Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 378í79. 
30 See Oppenheim, supra note 5. 
31 DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & FED. RESERVE BD., JOINT REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE PROCEDURES ACT 7 (Fed. Reserve Bd. 
1998). 
32 U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2002); see also FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(1) (2014). 
33 U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1) (2002); see also FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(1)(a). 
34 U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(2) (2002); see also FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(1)(b). 
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promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of 
money.”35 UCC section 3-104(a)(3) provides three exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that the promise or order must not contain any instruction or under-
taking other than the payment of money.36 These exceptions are: (i) an 
undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure pay-
ment; (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or 
realize or dispose of collateral; and (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law 
intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.37 None of these ex-
ceptions apply here. 
By clear UCC definition, once an additional promise or undertaking is 
identified, the character of the note cannot be said to be negotiable and the 
note is not subject to transfer or enforcement pursuant to UCC article 3.38 The 
act of endorsing and transferring a mortgage promissory note with such ad-
ditional promise or undertaking is a nullity, because endorsement and deliv-
ery only effectuates a transfer of a negotiable instrument.39 If an instrument is 
nonnegotiable, it must be transferred pursuant to general contract law.40 
C. The “Holder in Due Course” Doctrine 
A “holder in due course” is defined by the UCC section 3-302 as: 
[T]he holder of an instrument if: (1) the instrument when issued or nego-
tiation to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or 
alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into ques-
tion its authenticity; and (2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, 
(ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the instrument is overdue or has 
been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to pay-
ment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without 
notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been 
altered, (v) without notice of any claim to the instrument described in 
Section 3-306, and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or 
claim in recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).41 
Under the holder in due course doctrine, a subsequent holder of a promis-
sory note who takes said note in good faith for value and without notice of 
                                                                                                                         
35 U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) (2002); see also FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(1)(c). 
36 U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) (2002). 
37 Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(1)(c). 
38 See U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) (2002). 
39 Id. 
40 Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (“If the note is a 
negotiable instrument, the parties’ rights are governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code; if it is nonnegotiable, we must look to the common law of contracts to define 
the parties’ rights and remedies.”). 
41 U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002). 
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any apparent forgery or defenses is protected from such defenses in the 
event that the holder is forced to enforce collection efforts for the debt 
against the note maker.42 “The cutting off of defenses upon transfer to a 
holder in due course has long been considered the central element of nego-
tiable instruments.”43 Notably, while this doctrine protects financial insti-
tutions who purchase promissory notes and other negotiable instruments on 
the secondary market, the doctrine also puts the uneducated or financially 
unsophisticated members of the population at incredible risk of predatory 
lending practices.44 Most lenders who engage in such practices generally 
sell the promissory notes immediately after a deal closes, often on the same 
day the note is signed.45 The holder in due course doctrine cuts off what are 
termed “personal defenses,” which include defenses such as (1) less than full 
competence; (2) misrepresentations regarding the contents of the documents 
being signed; and (3) undue influence.46 On the other hand, the holder in due 
course doctrine preserves what are termed “real defenses” such as (1) infancy; 
(2) duress; (3) lack of legal capacity; (4) illegality of the transaction; (5) dis-
charge in bankruptcy; and (6) fraud regarding the nature of the instrument.47 
During the real estate boom, subprime lending focused on exploiting 
areas that would give rise to personal defenses, such as misrepresenting the 
terms of the loan, misrepresenting a borrower’s income in order to qualify 
for a loan, and many other unsavory practices by the loan originator.48 Of 
course, any defense that a borrower could have raised based on such prac-
tices was then immediately destroyed by an almost instantaneous transfer 
of the note to a bona fide purchaser who obtained holder in due course status. 
This practice was used so often that at times the note was actually sold to a 
secondary purchaser before it was even signed by the borrower.49 
The holder in due course doctrine is the proverbial coup for financial in-
stitutions, as it allows them to have their cake and eat it too.50 The doctrine 
eviscerates the greatest risk inherent in the secondary mortgage market: the 
                                                                                                                         
42 See id. 
43 Eggert, supra note 7, at 375. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 375í76. In the authors’ legal practice involving defense of mortgage fore-
closures, it is extremely common to see an assignment of mortgage dated the same day as 
the execution of the promissory note, or even instructions to the recording office on the 
mortgage indicating that the recorded mortgage should be returned to a secondary financial 
institution who has purchased the rights to the loan before the pen is even put to paper on 
the loan documents. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 375. 
48 Id. at 365. 
49 Id. 
50 See U.C.C. § 3-305 (2002). 
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risk that the originating lender participated in some fraud or deception in 
procuring the note from the maker.51 The greatest risk to a purchaser on the 
secondary market is that a maker will have some defense to the allegation 
of debt owed to the holder.52 However, distinguished scholars have noted 
that advancements such as securitization of notes and mortgages have dimin-
ished the applicability of the holder in due course doctrine such that “its le-
gitimate purposes have disappeared.”53 
D. The Comeback of the Promissory Note 
While the use of promissory notes and other negotiable instruments de-
creased steadily after the creation of a fiat monetary system based on paper 
currency in the late nineteenth century, the promissory note started to make a 
comeback following the codification of negotiable instruments law.54 In 
1896, Uniform Law Commissioners passed the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, which led to a rapid increase in lending from banks and small 
finance companies to poorer, less educated merchants and workers.55 While 
such lending was risky due to the high chance of default, lenders used prom-
issory notes to ensure payment tied in some manner to collateral backing 
the loans, which led to the development of the modern secured transaction 
in which a maker executes both a promissory note and mortgage securing 
it to some real or personal property in order to guarantee repayment of the 
debt.56 Kurt Eggert, Assistant Professor at Chapman University School of 
Law wrote in his article Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory 
of Form over Intent in Negotiable Instruments Law: 
Instead of trusting to the good name of borrowers or indorsers or to the 
guarantee provided by the acceptors of bills, these lenders began to trust in 
collateral. The lenders became intent on securing the loans with real or per-
sonal property so that they could turn to the security should the bor-
rowers default. The lenders’ need to rely on security caused them to 
change the form of promissory notes completely. Instead of the simple, 
straightforward instruments used from before the time of Lord Mansfield, 
which were drafted by hand and easily understood by all parties to 
them, the notes used by 1900 had grown, in Grant Gilmore’s words, to 
                                                                                                                         
51 Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 607 (1981). 
52 Id. 
53 Eggert, supra note 7, at 377. 
54 See Amasa M. Eaton, The Negotiable Instruments Law: Its History and Its Practical 
Operation, 2 MICH. L. REV. 260, 264 (1904). 
55 Id. 
56 Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 
1057, 1070 (1954). 
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“monstrous size.” This size was necessary to allow the drafters to ad-
dress all of the new concerns that their need for security added.57 
Once lenders began taking collateral to secure the repayment of the 
debt owed under a promissory note, lenders became concerned with various 
other issues such as collection of the collateral after default, care and mainte-
nance of the collateral, insurance regarding the collateral, and accelerating 
the lender’s rights to full repayment of a debt upon default by the maker.58 
These concerns led to a fundamental breakdown in the rule most inherent to 
the structure of a promissory note: that it employs the least number of words 
possible.59 Instead, notes began to morph into much longer and more com-
plex lending instruments, often containing various additional provisions and 
undertakings by the maker, creating the legal fiction that more language 
was better.60 
E. Lincoln National Bank v. Perry: A Prediction of the Future of 
Promissory Notes 
Today’s promissory notes bear little resemblance to the promissory notes 
of seventeenth-century England.61 In Lincoln National Bank v. Perry, the 
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, with remarkable foresight into the future of 
promissory notes in the commercial context, forewarned of the risk of fraud 
and deception to makers if financial institutions were allowed to continue to 
include burdensome and complex language in promissory notes.62 The case 
involved a promissory note that had been negotiated by specific endorsement 
to two subsequent holders prior to the initiation of the suit.63 In defense to 
the suit on the promissory note, the defendants pled multiple defenses, in-
cluding violation of the state constitution, fraud in the inducement, and 
failure of consideration.64 
                                                                                                                         
57 Eggert, supra note 7, at 401í02. 
58 Id. at 410. 
59 Overton v. Tyler, et al., 3 Pa. 346, 346 (1846). 
60 Lincoln Nat’l Bank v. Perry, 66 F. 887, 894 (8th Cir. 1895) (citing Bank v. Armstrong, 
25 Minn. 530, 530 (1879); South Bend Iron Works v. Paddock, 15 P. 574, 574 (Kan. 1887); 
Bank of Carroll v. Taylor, 25 N.W. 810, 810 (Iowa 1885); Smith v. Maryland, 13 N.W. 852, 
852 (Iowa 1882); Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan. 310, 310 (1881)). 
61 See Promissory Note Example, SAMPLE NOTE, http://www.samplenote.org/types 
/promissory-note-example (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/V98Q 
-E28R; see Manuscripts and Special Collections, THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, http: 
//www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/accounting/cash 
substitutes.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H82P-GRR2. 
62 Perry, 66 F. at 887í95. 
63 Id. at 887í90. 
64 Id. at 889í90. 
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Thus, due to the defenses raised, all of which were “personal defenses” 
cut off by the holder in due course doctrine, the court was first required to 
consider whether the promissory note was in fact a negotiable instrument 
and thus subject to transfer by endorsement alone.65 In finding that the note 
was not negotiable due to the complex language and various undertakings 
included therein, the court noted: 
It will be observed that there is embodied in the note an agreement to 
the effect that if there shall be any depreciation, prior to the maturity of the 
note, in the collateral deposited to secure its payment, then the payee or 
any holder may call for such further security, as he deems satisfactory, 
and, if the same is not furnished within two days, may proceed at once 
to sell the collateral. 
... 
It frequently happens that notes discounted by banks contain a statement 
that certain securities have been deposited as collateral to secure their 
payment, together with a stipulation authorizing a sale of such securi-
ties, in a certain manner, at the maturity of the paper, if it is not then paid. 
Such recitals and stipulations do not render the time or fact of payment, 
nor the amount to be paid at maturity, in the least degree uncertain; and for 
that reason it is generally held that they do not impair the negotiability 
of a note that is, in other respects, so drawn as to satisfy the require-
ments of the law merchant. 
... 
It is manifest, however, that an important element of certainty is destroyed 
by a collateral agreement appended to a note which may cause a payment 
to be made thereon of an uncertain sum at an uncertain time before ma-
turity, and thus render the amount payable at maturity somewhat less 
than the amount specified on the face of the paper. 
... 
It has accordingly been held in several well considered cases that stipu-
lations of that nature embodied in a promissory note will impair its ne-
gotiability.66 
The court, in considering the terms of the subject promissory note and the 
holdings of other similar cases, determined that the note was not negotiable, 
and in so holding stated: 
We are forced to concur in the view taken by these cases,—that the ne-
gotiability of a promissory note ought not to be upheld when it contains 
an agreement authorizing the holder in a certain contingency to demand 
such further collateral security as he deems satisfactory, and if it is not fur-
nished, to sell the original collateral and to apply the proceeds in pay-
ment of the paper before it had become due. Under existing decisions 
permitting negotiable notes to contain a stipulation authorizing the sale 
                                                                                                                         
65 Id. at 890. 
66 Id. at 892í93 (emphasis added). 
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at maturity of collateral securities, and, in some states, authorizing the in-
sertion of an agreement to pay exchange and attorney’s fees, as well as 
a warrant to confess judgment, such instruments have already been bur-
dened with all of the luggage which they can conveniently carry. Fur-
thermore, as notes and bills are designed to circulate freely, and to take 
the place of money in commercial transactions, sound policy would seem 
to dictate that they should be in form as concise as possible, and that the 
obligation assumed by the maker or makers should be expressed in plain 
and simple language.67 
The court further cautioned: 
It is easy to foresee that, if parties are permitted to burden negotiable 
notes with all sorts of collateral engagements, they will frequently be 
used for the purpose of entrapping the inexperienced and the unwary 
into agreements which they had no intention of making, against which 
the law will afford them no redress. We hold, therefore, that the note in 
suit was a nonnegotiable instrument.68 
F. How the System of Promissory Notes Has Become Defunct in Modern Times 
While the use of promissory notes and other negotiable instruments 
made sense when people lived in the same geographical area, their ability to 
remain useful in a global marketplace has significantly diminished.69 As 
Ronald Mann wrote in his article Searching for Negotiability in Payment and 
Credit Systems: 
[T]imes have changed and with them the size and interrelations of our 
economy, as well as the state of information technology. In this modern 
age of multiple and rapid transactions in a national and perhaps global 
market, negotiability’s emphasis on the physical document is a hindrance 
rather than a benefit. In many transactions, transporting a document from 
buyer to seller is no longer a simple matter of pushing a piece of paper 
across a table. Furthermore, even if the buyer and the seller meet face-to-
face, the financial institution on whom the instrument is drawn commonly 
is located at a distance from one or both of the parties to the underlying 
transaction. The frequent need to transport the document thousands of 
miles is a much more common problem now than it was in the era when 
our country was founded.70 
Promissory notes are still commonly used to finance the purchase of real 
property; however, their use has actually become much more harmful than 
beneficial given the ability to easily forge signatures, stamp “endorsements,” 
                                                                                                                         
67 Id. at 894 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
69 Mann, supra note 14, at 961í62. 
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and robo-sign allonges to give the illusion of compliance with the anti-
quated rules of negotiability.71 The doctrine of the “holder in due course,” 
which destroys many of the maker’s defenses to such fraud, has left the con-
suming public at risk of being subject to the continued mercy of financial 
institutions, often without any ability to fight back once a promissory note 
has been negotiated.72 In addition, while note makers in seventeenth-century 
England were very familiar with the ins and outs of negotiation and trans-
fer of negotiable instruments,73 as Judge Summers stated today, “‘the average 
citizen, and particularly the financially unimportant, [is] no more likely to 
know the law of negotiable paper ... than the holding in Shelley’s Case.’”74 
Moreover, the complex division of ownership and servicing rights for 
loans backed by promissory notes are a far cry from the original idea of 
promissory notes in which the person collecting payments was the actual 
party to whom a debt was owed, and the person who maintained physical 
possession of the note.75 The modern system of dividing beneficial and legal 
rights under promissory notes makes it nearly impossible for a note maker 
to determine whom it actually owes a debt to, and leaves the maker open to 
multiple claims by various parties on the same debt.76 The concept of trans-
ferring rights by physically transferring commercial paper inherent in the 
laws of negotiability is no longer applicable.77 While notes used to be trans-
ferred from one holder to another by physical transfer of the document, as 
contemplated by the laws of negotiability, in modern times physical doc-
uments are rarely transferred beyond a document storage facility even 
when the right to collect on the debt is sold from one financial institution 
                                                                                                                         
71 Roy Oppenheim, Robosigning Settlement Proves Sky Was Falling! Chicken Little Was 
Right!, S. FLA. LAW BLOG (Feb. 10, 2012), http://southfloridalawblog.com/robosigning 
-settlement-proves-sky-was-falling-chicken-little-was-right/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/XY6A-87MS. 
72 Thomas Erskine Ice, Negotiating the American Dream: A Critical Look at the Role 
of Negotiability in the Foreclosure Crisis, 86 FLA. B. J. 8 (2012). 
73 Eggert, supra note 7, at 366 (“[N]egotiability and its primary effects were once understood 
by the people who created negotiable instruments and [who] by and large intended to 
create those instruments and be bound by those effects. Because of this knowledge and 
intent by the instruments’ makers, the law of negotiable instruments developed and worked 
fairly efficiently given the primitive financial system available. As the knowledge of nego-
tiable instruments declined and as those instruments came to be created by many who have no 
idea of the nature or legal effects of negotiability, this efficiency has diminished alarmingly. 
Negotiable instrument law and the financial industry have come to assign the risk of fraud, 
theft and deception in such a way as to increase and encourage deceptive practices.”). 
74 Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 182 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (quoting Buffalo 
Indus. Bank v. DeMarzio, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 785 (City Ct. 1937), rev’d, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 
(Sup. 1937)). 
75 Mann, supra note 14, at 961í62. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 962. 
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to another.78 Documents are rarely transferred by endorsement until such time 
as they are removed from a document storage warehouse for presentment if a 
debt is not paid.79 
G. Predatory Lending Practices Resulting from the Holder in Due 
Course Doctrine 
Given the rampant abuse of consumers due to the growth of predatory 
lending practices that led to the Great Recession, the court’s prediction in 
Lincoln National Bank was extremely accurate.80 During the 1920s and into 
the 1930s, consumer credit lending increased exponentially, leading to a mas-
sive scale increase in the use of promissory notes as a method of financing 
consumer transactions.81 While in seventeenth-century England parties were 
generally both makers and holders of negotiable instruments, and thus had 
clear knowledge of the rules of both sides of the instruments, makers in the 
first part of the twentieth century by and large were consumers who had never 
been holders of negotiable instruments, and who had little knowledge as to 
the ramifications of executing a promissory note.82 Promissory notes were 
prepared by financial institutions and contained complex and diverse under-
takings, including the requirement of collateral, the payment of expenses and 
attorneys’ fees, prepayment penalty clauses, and all other sorts of “luggage,” 
which flew in the face of traditional tenets of negotiability.83 
The potential to make massive amounts of money, combined with a com-
parative low level of risk to lenders, led to a rapid growth of unethical lending 
practices while personal defenses against the original lenders disappeared 
upon transfer.84 During the peak of predatory lending in consumer transac-
tions, consumers bought cars that were never delivered or that could not be 
driven, household appliances that failed to function, and innumerable other 
goods and services that were sub-par or nonexistent.85 Moreover, consumers 
entered into said notes completely unaware that once the loan was transferred, 
their right to sue on the basis of the quality of the good or service, or for 
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80 Lincoln Nat’l Bank v. Perry, 66 F. 887, 894–95 (8th Cir. 1895). 
81 Simon D. Norton, The Cause of the Banking Crises of the 1920’s, THE WORLD FIN. 
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83 Eggert, supra note 7, at 399í400, 403, 414í15. 
84 William C. Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 
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85 See Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 
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fraudulent misrepresentations used to induce them to enter into the promis-
sory notes, would be lost forever under the holder in due course doctrine, 
which obliterated personal defenses.86 
“Faced with consumers burdened with worthless automobiles, house-
hold appliances, or home improvements and lenders who claimed holder in 
due course status, courts sought ways to ameliorate the most pernicious ef-
fects of the holder in due course doctrine in consumer transactions.”87 Often, 
courts would do so by finding that the promissory notes at issue were not ne-
gotiable instruments, and thus the consumers would still be permitted to 
raise defenses that otherwise would be destroyed under the holder in due 
course doctrine.88 
In the early 1950s, the UCC was being drafted to replace its predecessor 
treatises and statutes.89 However, while its drafters originally intended to 
include additional protections for consumers (including limiting the holder 
in due course doctrine to commercial transactions with more sophisticated 
borrowers), due to pressure from special interest groups largely comprised 
of financial institutions and other lenders, none of these protections made 
it into the UCC that was eventually adopted and codified by most states.90 
Instead, remarkably, the drafters of the UCC cowed to these special interests 
and further expanded the definition of negotiability to allow for the inclu-
sion of additional terms in promissory notes without destroying the nego-
tiability thereof.91 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) finally got involved to reduce the 
victimization of consumers by promulgating the Holder in Due Course Rule, 
which was intended to stymie the rampant victimization of consumers 
through predatory lending practices.92 The FTC’s Holder in Due Course Rule, 
which applies to all consumer retail installment contracts, requires credit 
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instruments to include language stating that any holder takes the instrument 
subject to any defenses that could be asserted against the original seller.93 
When the FTC promulgated its Holder in Due Course Rule, it focused 
specifically on consumer goods transactions, due to the great risk to consum-
ers in contracts in which the debt was separated from the actual goods sold, 
thereby splitting product warranties from the debt obligations.94 The FTC, 
after a plethora of decisions from various state courts allowing consumers 
to raise defenses against assignees, promulgated its Holder in Due Course 
Rule because of unfair outcomes that resulted from the division of these 
debt obligations and product warranties, which resulted in consumers being 
forced to pay a debt to an assignee even when the product financed from 
the seller was defective.95 
Notably, before the Holder in Due Course Rule, a purchaser of goods 
would purchase a product from the original seller under a retail installment 
contract, which required the purchaser to make payments over a period of 
time. The seller would then assign the debt in exchange for immediate pay-
ment and the assignee would continue to collect payments on the debt. How-
ever, problems arose when the product purchased had a defect, or when 
some other type of fraud arose in the underlying consumer goods transac-
tion between the purchaser and seller. Under the holder in due course doc-
trine, the purchaser was required to continue to pay the assignee for the 
faulty or defective product and seek redress from the original seller, who 
often had gone out of business or had no financial incentive to correct the 
problem, having already received payment from the assignee.96 Worse, the 
purchaser could not even assert the defective nature of the product as a de-
fense to any suit brought by the assignee to collect on the debt. 
As a result of the unfair consequences of such a rule, various state courts 
began allowing borrowers to assert defenses against the assignee despite 
the holder in due course doctrine for public policy reasons.97 In 1953, the 
                                                                                                                         
93 Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade Commission’s Holder in 
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Florida Supreme Court in Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin allowed a bor-
rower to assert defenses against an assignee seeking to collect on a debt it 
had purchased, holding that “the finance company is better able to bear the 
risk of the dealer’s insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to 
protect his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.”98 
However, the FTC’s Holder in Due Course Rule does not apply to the fi-
nancing of real estate, and thus leaves homebuyers open to the same rampant 
abuse that the FTC curtailed in invoking the Holder in Due Course Rule.99 
H. The FTC’s Holder in Due Course Rule Does Not Apply to Mortgage 
Notes and Thus Upholding the Rules of Negotiability Is Especially 
Important in Order to Protect Unsophisticated Borrowers 
Consumer groups have long fought for an extension of the FTC’s Holder 
in Due Course Rule for residential mortgage loans, but have been largely 
unsuccessful. The failure to procure a similar rule in residential mortgage 
loans is based on the premise that the underlying policy reasons for the 
Holder in Due Course Rule do not exist with regard to residential mortgage 
loans because the home purchased is not subject to any warranty by the 
lending institution providing funding for its purchase.100 
In 1994, consumer groups were partially successful in getting legisla-
tion passed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices in rela-
tion to high-cost mortgage refinancing through the enactment of the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA).101 However, 
HOEPA does not protect borrowers obtaining purchase money mortgages, 
even if predatory lending practices are involved, and instead is strictly limited 
to nonpurchase money, high-cost mortgage loans.102 In addition, the remedy 
under HOEPA is limited to rescission of the transaction and does not pro-
vide for monetary damages suffered by the borrower.103 
As a result of the limited application of the Holder in Due Course Rule 
and HOEPA, the true gatekeeper between fraudulent practices by financial 
institutions and the consuming public in relation to purchase money mort-
gage transactions remains the strict requirements of negotiability. However, 
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because courts have continued to relax these strict requirements in favor of 
financial institutions, the already limited protections that borrowers had have 
been effectively stripped, leaving them open and vulnerable to predatory 
lending practices with little redress against financial institutions. 
II. COURTS MUST CONSIDER THE TERMS OF A PROMISSORY NOTE IN ORDER 
TO DETERMINE IF IT IS TRULY A “NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT” 
Although many courts assume that all promissory notes are negotiable 
simply by virtue of being called a “promissory note,” some courts have 
recognized that a mortgage promissory note must be analyzed to determine 
whether the character of the note at issue is that of a negotiable instru-
ment.104 However, all too often in foreclosure actions, courts refuse to 
address the issue of the negotiability of mortgage promissory notes.105 
Instead, courts supply blanket statements that all notes are negotiable in-
struments without any real inquiry into the truth of such statements.106 
This baseless claim that all notes are negotiable instruments can no longer 
be accepted at face value under the “broad brush” with which the law of 
negotiable instruments has been painted.107 Courts must do their duty to 
first examine the note to determine whether it meets the definition of a 
“negotiable instrument.”108 
                                                                                                                         
104 Felin Assocs., Inc. v. Rogers, 38 A.D.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (“It is quite 
apparent that a note given in a real estate transaction in connection with a mortgage does 
not fall into the classification of a negotiable instrument. Certainly, absent affirmative proof 
this court is not and should not be required to presume that the note was negotiable.”) 
(citing Wright v. Wright, 54 N.Y. 437, 441 (1873); Peterson v. Meyer, 105 Misc. 719, 
721 (Cnty. Ct. of N.Y. 1919)); Am. Bank of the S. v. Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 623-24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“If there is any doubt that an instrument is negotiable, the courts generally find that it is 
nonnegotiable.”). 
105 See Ice, supra note 72, at 13. 
106 Riggs v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 36 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); 
see also Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (stating “a promissory note is a negotiable instrument.”); Perry v. Fairbanks, 888 So. 
2d 725, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating “[a] promissory note is clearly a negotiable 
instrument within the definition of section 673.1041(1).”). 
107 Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 375. 
108 See Ingram, 993 S.W.2d at 624 (“Whether an instrument is negotiable is a question 
of law to be determined by the court.”) (citing N. Bank v. Pefferoni Pizza Co., 562 N.W.2d 
374, 375-76 (Neb. 1997)); Cartwright v. MBank Corpus Christi, N.A., 865 S.W.2d 546, 549 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993); LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, § 3-101:48 (3d ed. 1994); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. All Ways, Inc., 546 
N.W.2d 807, 809 (1996). 
578 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:557 
A. Courts Have Consistently Held That Certain Undertakings Included in 
Promissory Notes Destroy Their Negotiability 
In the course of preparing to write this Article, the authors searched case 
law from all fifty states to determine what “additional provisions” con-
tained in promissory notes have been held to destroy their negotiability. 
Various courts across the country that have found mortgage promissory 
notes negotiable have done so through a broad interpretation of UCC sec-
tion 3-106(b)(i) and UCC section 3-104(a)(3)(i).109 On the other hand, the 
majority of courts that have found mortgage promissory notes negotiable 
have done so based on the belief that certain provisions in such notes do not 
adversely affect negotiability.110 
Unfortunately, most courts engaged in foreclosure “rocket dockets” have 
little time, resources, or inclination to consider whether the promissory notes 
being presented by financial institutions are in fact negotiable instru-
ments.111 In fact, doing so would significantly slow down the pace of such 
dockets, potentially causing a massive backlog of foreclosures as courts 
struggle with enforcement of billions of dollars of commercial paper that 
has been negotiated despite the fact that it is clearly not negotiable as a 
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-losers/, archived at http://perma.cc/XFG5-VU5R. 
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matter of law.112 Instead, most foreclosure court judges, under pressure from 
the legislative and executive branches of government to move cases and clear 
dockets, turn a blind eye to the fact that the most common promissory notes 
being presented by purported “holders in due course” are in fact not nego-
tiable due to the terms and undertakings included in them that ignore the 
basic tenets of negotiability.113 
In GMAC v. Honest Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., the Second Dis-
trict concluded that “the [trial] court erred in finding that the [retail install-
ment sales contract (‘RISC’)] [was] a negotiable instrument.”114 There, the 
court was confronted with a RISC entered into between GMAC and Honest 
Air for the purchase of an automobile.115 
The Second District noted that the RISC required the debtor to pay fees 
for late payment or dishonored checks, and held that these obligations “bring 
the RISC within the exclusionary language of section 673.1041(1)(c), 
which provides that a negotiable instrument ‘does not state any other un-
dertakings’ in addition to the payment of money.”116 The court reasoned that 
this must be so because “[a] negotiable instrument should be ‘simple, cer-
tain, unconditional, and subject to no contingencies. It must be a courier 
without luggage.’”117 
Likewise, in Geiger Finance Co. v. Graham,118 the court found that a re-
tail installment contract for pest control was not a negotiable instrument, as 
the “note” contained other provisions than simply the promise to repay.119 
Instead, the note included a grant to a holder of the instrument to waive par-
ticular defaults or remedies without waiving others, and a purported waiver 
by the maker of “any defense, counterclaim or cross complaint he could 
have asserted against the seller.”120 Thus, the court found that the note was 
clearly not a negotiable instrument, stating that the “intent [underlying the 
UCC] is that a negotiable instrument carries nothing but the simple prom-
ise to pay” and therefore inclusion of additional promises and conditions 
destroyed its negotiability.121 
                                                                                                                         
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Honest Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 933 
So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 37. 
117 Id. (citing Mason v. Flowers, 91 Fla. 224, 107 So. 334, 335 (Fla. 1926)); see also 
Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White, 73 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1996). 
118 182 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971). 
119 Id. at 524. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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In P & K Marble v. LaPaglia,122 the court not only declared the note non-
negotiable due to additional provisions it contained, but also went on to make 
a broad assertion that most notes related to the purchase of real property were 
not negotiable.123 In doing so, the court opined that: 
[A] note given in connection with a mortgage in a real estate transaction 
generally is not a negotiable instrument. Indeed, the subject note and 
mortgage does not fulfill at least one of the requirements of a [negotia-
ble instrument] as contained in UCC 3-104(1)(b) in that it fails to con-
tain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money 
and no other promise except as authorized by UCC article 3. The note and 
mortgage contains numerous promises, such as to keep the mortgaged 
property insured, which are not authorized by UCC article 3.124 
The court in Felin Associates, Inc. v. Rogers agreed with this contention, 
and also that found notes given in connection with a mortgage to secure real 
property were not negotiable, stating “[i]t is quite apparent that a note given 
in a real estate transaction in connection with a mortgage does not fall into 
the classification of a negotiable instrument. Certainly, absent affirmative 
proof this court is not and should not be required to presume that the note 
was negotiable.”125 
B. Notice of Prepayment Provision in Mortgage Promissory Note 
Destroys Its Negotiability 
UCC section 3-106 is in place to clarify the terminology “unconditional 
promise or order” used in the section 3-104 definition of a negotiable instru-
ment. UCC section 3-106(b)(i) states that “a promise or order is not made 
conditional (i) by a reference to another record for a statement of rights with 
respect to collateral, prepayment, or acceleration.”126 
This section specifically states that a promise is not conditional if there 
is reference to another record for a statement of rights regarding prepayment 
or acceleration.127 However, courts have allowed for additional “undertak-
ing[s] or instruction[s] ... in addition to the payment of money[,]” such as no-
tice of prepayment provisions, in the note itself.128 These courts apparently 
rely on the language in the official comment for UCC section 3-106, which 
states that “[a] statement of rights and obligations concerning collateral, 
                                                                                                                         
122 147 A.D.2d 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
123 Id. at 804í05. 
124 Id. 
125 Felin Associates, Inc. v. Rogers, 38 A.D.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). 
126 U.C.C. § 3-106(b)(i) (2002) (emphasis added). 
127 Id. 
128 See U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) (2002). 
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prepayment, or acceleration does not prevent the note from being an in-
strument if the statement is in the note itself.”129 
The seminal case for the proposition that the existence of a notice of pre-
payment provision130 in a mortgage promissory note does not render the note 
nonnegotiable is HSBC Bank USA v. Gouda.131 In Gouda, the makers con-
tended that the requirement of written notice contained in the prepayment 
provision renders the note nonnegotiable, as it constitutes an “undertaking 
or instruction” in addition to the payment of money.132 However, the court 
disagreed, stating: 
The right of defendants, under the note, to prepay part of the principal 
does not constitute an “additional undertaking or instruction” that ad-
versely affects the negotiability of the note. Quite the opposite, the right of 
prepayment is a voluntary option that defendants may elect to exercise 
solely at their discretion. Indeed, such an allowance confers a benefit, not a 
burden, upon defendants, who can freely choose to decline the opportunity. 
The fact that defendants must notify the lender in the event they opt for 
prepayment imposes no additional liability on them and is not a condi-
tion placed on defendants’ promise to pay. Rather, notification is simply a 
requirement of the exercise of the right of prepayment which, as noted, 
defendants are free to reject. This requirement does not render the note in 
issue non-negotiable.133 
Such an expansive interpretation of an “additional undertaking or instruc-
tion” in the Gouda court’s holding is often cited.134 However, it is based on 
defective reasoning. 
The court in Gouda proffered as its reasoning that since the prepay-
ment provision “confers a benefit, not a burden” on the defendants, it does 
not qualify as an “additional undertaking or instruction.”135 It may prove 
                                                                                                                         
129 U.C.C. § 3-106 (2002) (emphasis added). 
130 A typical prepayment provision is evidenced in the “FLORIDA FIXED RATE 
NOTE—Single Family—Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT.” The pre-
payment provision states, “I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time 
before they are due. A payment of Principal only is known as a ‘Prepayment.’ When I make a 
Prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in writing that I am doing so. I may not designate a 
payment as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments due under the Note.” 
131 2010 WL 5128666 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2010). 
132 Id. at *2. 
133 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
134 Picatinny Fed. Credit Union v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 09-1295, 2011 WL 
1337507, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2011); In re Verity, Bankr. No. 10-20880 (DHS), Adv. No. 10-
02373, 2012 WL 3561669, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2012); In re Mesina v. Citibank, 
NA., No. 10-2304 (RTL), 2012 WL 2501123, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 27, 2012); In re Kain, 
Bankr. No. 08-08404-HB, Adv. No. 10-80047-HB, 2012 WL 1098465, at *5 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
Mar. 30, 2012); In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 283í84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012). 
135 See Gouda, 2010 WL 5128666 at *3. 
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true that a maker is free to reject such a prepayment provision. It may also 
prove true that such a provision stands to benefit a maker. However, it is 
equally true that the notice requirement of a prepayment provision in a mort-
gage promissory note places an additional undertaking or instruction on 
the maker, especially if the maker chooses to prepay on the note. 
The drafters of the UCC state that to be negotiable, an instrument must 
not contain an additional “undertaking or instruction by the person promising 
or ordering payment to do an act in addition to the payment of money.”136 
Nowhere does article 3 state that the additional undertaking or instruction 
must be a burden, as the court in Gouda suggests.137 
C. Courts Have Held that Mortgage Promissory Notes Are Negotiable 
Even Where There Is Not a “Fixed Amount of Money” Due 
In order for a note to qualify as a negotiable instrument, the note needs to 
remain unconditional by meeting the “sum certain” requirement.138 In other 
words, to be considered a negotiable instrument, the note must have con-
tained a fixed amount of money to be repaid when executed by the maker.139 
To meet the fixed principal amount [or “sum certain”] requirement of 
the Uniform Commercial Code’s definition of negotiable instrument, 
the fixed amount generally must be determinable by reference to the in-
strument itself without any reference to any outside source. If reference 
to a separate instrument or extrinsic facts is needed to ascertain the princi-
pal due, the sum is not certain or fixed.140 
However, despite this unambiguous requirement, courts have twisted 
the legal construct in such a fashion as to make a contortionist proud by al-
lowing references outside the four corners of a negotiable instrument to 
determine the instrument’s adjustable interest rate.141 
In In re Kain, the maker signed a note containing an interest-only adjust-
able rate.142 The note provided for an initial fixed yearly rate that eventually 
changed to an adjustable rate.143 Upon foreclosure, the maker challenged the 
negotiability of the note.144 In addition to the plaintiff’s claim that the note 
                                                                                                                         
136 See U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) (2002). 
137 Id.; Gouda, 2010 WL 5128666, at *3. 
138 See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2002). 
139 Id. 
140 Heritage Bank v. Bruha, 812 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Neb. 2012) (emphasis added). 
141 See, e.g., In re Kain, Bankr. No. 08-08404-HB, Adv. No. 10-80047-HB, 2012 WL 
1098465, at *6 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2012). 
142 Id. at *2. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at *4. 
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was nonnegotiable under Gouda, the maker also argued that the note was 
nonnegotiable because the adjustable interest rate prohibits the note from 
having a “sum certain,” therefore destroying the note’s negotiability and pre-
venting the holder bringing the foreclosure action from having holder in due 
course status.145 The court referenced UCC article 3 in determining whether 
an adjustable interest rate disallows for “sum certain,” rendering the sub-
ject note a nonnegotiable instrument.146 The court stated that “even when 
executed simultaneously with a mortgage, a note remains subject to the pro-
visions of Article 3.”147 
Specifically, the court addressed the adjustable rate’s relation to the “sum 
certain” requirement.148 Additionally, the court made reference to article 3’s 
list of instances in which the “sum certain” requirement was not defeated, 
even though the amount payable was not explicitly stated in the four corners 
of an instrument.149 The court in In re Kain held that “[t]he statutory lan-
guage permitted parties to look beyond the four corners of a note to determine 
interest without destroying its negotiability.”150 Thus, the court denied the 
maker’s claim that an adjustable interest rate bars a promissory note from 
being negotiable.151 
Other significant cases finding a promissory note that references infor-
mation outside the document negotiable are Cashen v. Integrated Portfolio 
Management, Inc.152 and Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee.153 The court 
in Cashen held that the inclusion of externally determined interest rates into 
the reading of a note does not render it a nonnegotiable instrument.154 The 
court in Amberboy spoke directly on the “sum certain” requirement, stating 
“the sum certain requirement is not defeated even though the amount payable 
is not explicitly stated on the instrument.”155 The court’s rationale for declar-
ing the “sum certain” requirement met was that an adjustable rate note con-
taining a variable interest rate, which can be readily accessed by a simple 
                                                                                                                         
145 Id. at *6. 
146 Id. at *6í7. 
147 Id. at *4 (citing Northwestern Bank v. Neal, 248 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1987)). In regard to 
a note’s interest rate, U.C.C. article 3 provides that in order for a note to remain negotiable 
with an adjustable interest rate, the computation of interest “must be one which can be 
made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.” See U.C.C. § 3-
106 (2002). 
148 Id. at *6. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at *7. 
151 Id. 
152 No. 08-CV-268, 2008 WL 4976210, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2008). 
153 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992). 
154 Cashen, 2008 WL 4976210 at *3. 
155 Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 793. 
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reference to a bank’s published prime rate, is compatible with the UCC’s ob-
jective of “commercial certainty.”156 
Although one may believe the aforementioned cases make valid argu-
ments for allowing instruments containing adjustable interest rates to re-
main negotiable, the truth of the matter is that they are the exception rather 
than the rule. A fixed amount is an absolute requisite to negotiability.157 In 
the absence of a fixed amount, a subsequent holder cannot ascertain how 
much it is legally owed under the instrument, and a maker cannot determine 
how much he or she owes under it.158 Furthermore, a subsequent holder will 
be unable to determine a fair purchasing price, thereby defeating the basic 
purpose for creating negotiable instruments.159 
The case of Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee provides guidance 
for navigating the muddied waters of the negotiability of promissory notes 
with adjustable interest rates.160 After discussing the complexity of variable 
rate notes and sifting through various states’ laws on negotiability, the court 
in Amberboy held that a promissory note requiring interest to be charged at 
a rate that can be determined only by reference to a bank’s published prime 
rate is not a negotiable instrument as defined by Texas Uniform Commer-
cial Code.161 The court in Amberboy stated that “[i]n contrast to those cases 
upholding the negotiability of variable interest rate notes, which involved 
reference rates that are widely published and readily ascertainable,” the inter-
est in the current case could not be “readily determined by reference to a 
widely published rate.”162 In Amberboy, the note required the payment of: 
Interest on the principal amount remaining unpaid hereunder from time 
to time outstanding, at a rate per annum equal to the lesser of (a) the rate 
(the “Basic Rate”) which is equal to the sum of the prime interest rate (the 
“Prime Rate”) for short-term loans published by Lender, plus 2 percent 
(2%) per annum, which Basic Rate shall be variable and shall be adjusted 
for the term hereof, effective at the close of business on the day of any 
such change in the Prime Rate; or, (b) the maximum lawful rate of in-
terest (the “Maximum Rate”) permitted by applicable usury laws ....163 
Further analyzing the variable rate note, the court concluded that under 
the UCC, the readily ascertainable published rate required to keep the note 
                                                                                                                         
156 Id. at 796í98. 
157 U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2002); see also FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(1) (2014). 
158 Id. 
159 See id. 
160 Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 793í804. 
161 Id. at 793. 
162 Id. at 803 (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting). 
163 Id. (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Ackerman v. FDIC, 930 F.2d 3, 
4 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
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negotiable must amount to a “commercial certainty.”164 A note that is com-
mercially certain allows the note to function akin to money, and therefore 
allows the instrument to be accepted with a fixed, determinable amount.165 
The cases Heritage Bank v. Bruha166 and Ingram v. Earthman167 provide 
further insight into the rationale for ruling an instrument nonnegotiable due to 
its lack of a fixed amount.168 In the case of Heritage Bank, a note was ruled 
nonnegotiable based on the fact that it contained language requiring an in-
quiry outside of the document’s four corners to determine the amount 
owed.169 In Heritage Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) sold a promissory note received from a failed bank to Heritage 
Bank.170 Heritage brought an action against the maker, who had originally 
contracted with the failed bank, to collect on the note.171 The maker argued 
that Heritage Bank lacked standing to bring a claim on the note because the 
note was a nonnegotiable instrument due to the absence of a determinable 
fixed amount.172 The court then examined the language of the note’s promise 
to pay and variable interest rate, stating: 
The note evidenced a promise to pay “the principal amount of Seventy-
five Thousand & 00/100 ($75,000.00) or so much as may be outstand-
ing, together with interest on the unpaid outstanding principal balance 
of each advance.” The note stated that it “evidence[d] a revolving line of 
credit.” The note contained a variable interest rate. The rate was subject 
to change every month and calculated on an index maintained by Sherman 
County Bank. The interest rate on Bruha’s note was 1 percentage point 
under the percentage on the index at any given time. The initial rate was 
7.25 percent, and was later adjusted to 6.75 percent. On default, this in-
terest rate would increase by 5 percentage points.173 
After examining the note, the court declared the subject note nonnego-
tiable, concluding: 
Here, the text of the note states that Bruha “promises to pay ... the princi-
pal amount of Seventy-five Thousand & 00/100 Dollars ($75,000.00) 
or so much as may be outstanding ....” (Emphasis supplied.) Further, the 
note states that it “evidences a revolving line of credit” and that Bruha 
                                                                                                                         
164 Id. at 796. 
165 Id. 
166 812 N.W.2d 260 (Neb. 2012). 
167 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). 
168 See Heritage Bank, 812 N.W.2d at 268; see also Ingram, 993 S.W.2d at 624. 
169 Heritage Bank, 812 N.W.2d at 268. 
170 Id. at 266. 
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172 See id. at 268. 
173 Id. at 265 (emphasis added). 
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could request advances under the obligation up to $75,000. This fails 
the “fixed amount of money” requirement of § 3-104(a); one looking at 
the instrument itself cannot tell how much Bruha has been advanced at 
any given time .... Stated simply, “[a] note given to secure a line of credit 
under which the amount of the obligation varies, depending on the extent 
to which the line of credit is used, is not negotiable ....”174 
Because the note contained the language “or so much as to be outstanding,” 
one cannot pinpoint how much the maker had been advanced at any given 
time by looking solely at the instrument.175 As a result, the instrument was 
determined to be nonnegotiable and Heritage Bank had no standing to 
bring a claim against the maker for the note’s balance.176 
Likewise, in the case of Ingram, a lender filed suit against a maker on a 
note to recover an amount due from a personal loan, including interest.177 
The court found the note to be nonnegotiable due to the uncertainty in the 
note’s language regarding the amount of interest to be paid.178 The court 
stated: 
[The] note did not satisfy the “sum certain” requirement in Tenn. Code 
Ann. §§ 47-3-104(1)(b), -106 when it was signed because its interest 
rate could not be computed “from the instrument itself without reference to 
any outside source.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-106 cmt. 1. The note 
provided for interest “[a]t the Bank’s ‘Prime Rate’ plus ___% per year.” It 
also defined the “Bank” as “Frederic B. Ingram” and “Prime Rate” as 
the “Bank’s rate for loans to its most credit worthy customers for 90-day 
unsecured loans.” Thus, the note required Mr. Earthman to pay interest 
at whatever rate Mr. Ingram charged his most credit worthy customers 
for ninety-day unsecured loans. 
 
This interest rate provision ... certainly does not permit the calculation 
of interest from the face of the instrument itself.179 
In summary, because Mr. Ingram’s “Prime Rate” was not based on a 
readily ascertainable, objective marketplace standard, the calculation of the 
note’s sum required extrinsic criteria.180 Because there was a necessity to 
look outside the “four corners” of the document to determine the note’s true 
sum, the note was not for a sum certain and, therefore, was not negotiable.181 
                                                                                                                         
174 Id. at 268. 
175 Id. 
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177 Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). 
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D. Reference or Incorporation of Another Document Into the Note Can 
Destroy Its Negotiability 
It is common practice in drafting promissory notes to make reference 
to the note being secured by an additional document, such as a mortgage; 
however, when the reference to another document constructs a condition 
on the note, courts consider the additional document incorporated into the 
note.182 When a condition is conferred onto a note, it is no longer consid-
ered a negotiable instrument.183 It should be noted, however, that the “mere 
reference” to a document such as a mortgage or security agreement does not 
automatically render a note nonnegotiable.184 
The prime example of a note referencing an additional document and 
maintaining its negotiability can be found in the case of Cashen v. Integrated 
Portfolio Mgmt., Inc.185 In Cashen, the negotiability of a note containing a 
reference to a security interest was challenged.186 The court addressed the 
issue of the security interest, holding that the mere reference to a security 
agreement in an instrument does not render a note nonnegotiable.187 The 
court elaborated on the meaning of a “reference,” stating “the promise or 
order may contain … an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect 
collateral to secure payment,” so long as the reference to the security inter-
est does not form a condition upon the note.188 
Although a mere reference to a security agreement has failed to defeat 
a note’s negotiability, many courts hold that when a mortgage is incorpo-
rated into the note rather than merely referenced, the note is no longer ne-
gotiable.189 Promissory notes that incorporate the terms of an additional 
document, through reference to said additional document, become “subject to 
                                                                                                                         
182 See Sims v. New Falls Corp., 37 So. 3d 358, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding 
that the note was governed by Florida law rather than the Georgia choice of law provision 
in the mortgage specifically because the note only referenced the mortgage and was 
careful not to expressly incorporate the mortgage for fear of destroying negotiability). 
183 U.C.C. § 3-106(a) (2002). 
184 Id. The Fannie/Freddie Note walks a thin line when it comes to this distinction as 
seen in the amicus curiae brief submitted by the Real Property Probate & Trust Law 
Section of The Florida Bar in Sims, 37 So. 3d at 363í64, wherein the section explained 
that “[t]he legal reason why the form promissory note is silent as to choice of laws and 
does not incorporate by reference the terms of the security deed appears to be that the 
inclusion of such terms could affect the negotiable status of the note.” 
185 No. 08-CV-268, 2008 WL 4976210, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2008). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. 1601 Partners, Ltd., 796 F. Supp. 238, 240 
(N.D. Tex. 1992). 
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or governed by” another agreement, thereby rendering the promise in the 
promissory note conditional.190 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incorpo-
ration by reference” as: 
The method of making one document of any kind become a part of an-
other separate document by referring to the former in the latter, and declar-
ing that the former shall be taken and considered as a part of the latter 
the same as if it were fully set out therein.191 
When an additional document is incorporated into a note by reference, 
the additional document is declared a part of the note in which the declara-
tion is made, “as much as if it were set out at length therein.”192 When an 
additional document is deemed incorporated into a note, the additional docu-
ment confers any and all of its possible conditions on to the note.193 When 
a note is subject to an additional document’s conditions via incorporation 
by reference, the promise contained in that note is then considered condi-
tional, and the note nonnegotiable.194 The fine-line distinction between a 
“reference to” and “incorporation of” an additional document in a potentially 
negotiable instrument is examined in the case of Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
1601 Partners, Ltd.195 
In Resolution Trust Corp., a note referencing a deed of trust using the 
language “the terms, agreements and conditions of [the Deed of Trust] are 
by reference made a part of this instrument” was held to have crossed the 
threshold of a mere reference and stripped the note of its negotiability.196 
The court proclaimed: 
Section 3.105(b) of the UCC provides that a promise is not uncondi-
tional if the instrument “states that it is subject to or governed by any 
other agreement.” Here, the note states that “the terms, agreements and 
conditions of [the Deed of Trust] are by reference made a part of this 
instrument.”... Mere reference to a note being secured by a mortgage, 
of course, is common commercial practice and does not affect the ne-
gotiability of the note .... The language within the note ... exceeds the 
outer bounds of “mere reference,” as it explicitly purports to incorporate 
the terms of the Deed of Trust.197 
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191 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
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195 Resolution Trust Corp., 796 F. Supp. at 240. 
196 Id.; see also U.C.C. § 3-105(b) (2002). 
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The court’s examination of the note’s language combined substance 
with semantics.198 The inclusion of the phrase “made a part of this instru-
ment” effectively incorporated the deed (an additional document) into the 
note (the original document).199 As a result, the note was subject to an addi-
tional document, thereby completely altering the function and negotiability 
of the instrument.200 The deed’s incorporation through reference thus ex-
tinguished the note’s negotiability.201 
III. THE ABSENCE OF NEGOTIABILITY IN THE STANDARD FANNIE MAE AND 
FREDDIE MAC PROMISSORY NOTES 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government sponsored enterprises 
responsible for the largest share of the secondary mortgage market, pro-
mulgated a standard form promissory note and mortgage to be used in resi-
dential property purchases.202 This form is an essential requirement for any 
loan originator who wants to have the possibility of selling the note and 
mortgage to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.203 If a loan is not originated with 
these documents, then the originator loses these government entities as 
possible secondary market purchasers for the loan.204 Unfortunately, in draft-
ing the form promissory note, its constructors made many inclusions in 
order to protect a future holder, which render the note nonnegotiable as a 
matter of law.205 Professor Ronald Mann stated: 
The irrelevance of negotiability to home-mortgage note transactions is 
best demonstrated by the fact that the standard form of promissory note 
used for those transactions fails to satisfy the requirements of negotia-
bility. Because of the strong interest in uniformity in the large securitized 
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home-mortgage note transactions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
promulgated a number of standard forms for use in those transactions. 
... 
Sending a notice certainly is an act “in addition to the payment of money,” 
and the note’s language seems to constitute an “undertaking” to per-
form that act (albeit only on certain conditions). Accordingly, it seems 
unlikely that the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac form qualifies as negotiable. 
Thus, the rules of Article 3 (including its holder-in-due-course protec-
tions) do not apply. 
... 
[T]he preceding paragraphs offer an obvious answer: the benefits of 
negotiability have no practical significance to the operation of the cur-
rent system. 
... 
[I]t is far more sensible to leave negotiability by the wayside in order to 
pursue the financial advantages promised by access to a large and highly 
liquid secondary market. Because the home-mortgage note cannot prac-
ticably assure the benefits of negotiability, there is no reason why the 
parties drafting the notes that the system uses should take any great care 
to ensure that the notes retain technical negotiability. Furthermore, the 
absence of negotiability from the most common form of note suggests 
that the parties that draft those notes in fact do not take care to protect 
the negotiability of the obligations in question.206 
Although it is clear that the form promissory note that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac use is not negotiable by any definition of negotiability pro-
vided under article 3 of the UCC, courts have continued to uphold the legal 
fiction that these notes are transferable by negotiation.207 These notes, 
unlike Pinocchio who wears his lies on his face, continue to hide their true 
character and are continually permitted to do so due to political pressure 
and lobbying by financial institutions asking the judicial branch (which is 
supposed to remain impartial and impassive) to continue to turn a blind 
eye to this obvious farce.208 We ask the courts to remain unswayed by this 
political pressure and to uphold the law. 
A. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Form Promissory Notes Contain 
Numerous Provisions that Destroy Their Negotiability 
The third prong of the definition of what constitutes a “promissory note,” 
as well as the case law set forth above regarding the destruction of nego-
tiability, is of fundamental importance because the standard note form ap-
proved by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac contains a host of undertakings and 
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instructions by the person promising or ordering payment to do some act 
in addition to the payment of money.209 
By clear UCC definition, once such an additional promise or undertak-
ing is identified, the character of the note cannot be said to be negotiable 
and the note is not subject to transfer or enforcement pursuant to UCC 
article 3.210 The act of endorsing and transferring a mortgage promissory 
note with such an additional promise or undertaking is a nullity, because 
endorsement and delivery only effectuates a transfer of a negotiable instru-
ment.211 If an instrument is nonnegotiable, it must be transferred pursuant 
to general contract law.212 
One such provision that is evidenced in the standard note form approved 
by the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the “Fannie/Freddie Note”213) is for 
“late charges.”214 Such charges were considered obligations other than the 
payment of money, which rendered the RISC in GMAC nonnegotiable.215 
Furthermore, the Fannie/Freddie Note contains: (1) the instruction that 
the lender will deliver or mail to the borrower any changes in the interest rate 
and monthly payments; (2) the obligation that the borrower tell the lender, 
in writing, if borrower opts to prepay;216 (3) the instruction that if applica-
ble law “is finally interpreted” so that the interest charged under the note 
or other loan charges exceed legal limits, then (a) any such loan charge shall 
be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted 
limit, and (b) any sums already collected by the lender that exceed permitted 
limits shall be refunded to the borrower; the instruction that the lender send 
written notice of default; (4) the instruction entitling the lender to be paid 
back by the borrower for all costs and expenses; (5) the instruction that the 
lender send any notices that must be given to the borrower pursuant to the 
                                                                                                                         
209 See Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage 
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terms of the note by either delivering it or mailing it by first class mail; and 
(6) the instruction that the borrower send any notices that must be given to 
the lender pursuant to the terms of the note by either delivering it or mail-
ing it by first class mail.217 
Additionally, the Fannie/Freddie uniform mortgage instrument (the 
“Fannie/Freddie Mortgage”218) that accompanies the Fannie/Freddie Note 
often contains a provision that is an express condition on payment, which 
under UCC section 3-106(a)(i) renders the Fannie/Freddie Note a conditional 
promise and therefore, under UCC section 3-104(a), nonnegotiable.219 
Each of these instructions is an additional obligation other than for the 
payment of money, which renders the Fannie/Freddie Note nonnegotiable. 
Therefore, any party purporting to be the holder of a negotiable instrument 
cannot enforce the Fannie/Freddie Note as a negotiable instrument, trans-
ferable by endorsement alone. 
B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Acknowledge That Their Promissory 
Note Explicitly Incorporates the Mortgage 
In Sims v. New Falls Corp., the court requested an amicus curiae brief 
of the Real Property Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar re-
garding the negotiability of the Fannie/Freddie Note and Mortgage.220 
That brief included an opinion letter from counsel for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.221 In deciding Sims, the Third District explicitly reached 
their conclusions through “application of the guidance received from 
FNMA/FHLMC[,]” “the drafter of both documents.”222 In the absence of 
                                                                                                                         
217 See, e.g., MULTISTATE FIXED RATE NOTE—Single Family—Fannie Mae 
/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT, supra note 205. 
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219 Paragraph 16 of the Fannie/Freddie Mortgage often states in relevant part: 
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220 Sims v. New Falls Corp., 37 So. 3d 358, 361í62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review 
denied, 49 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2010). 
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contrary authority, the guidance contained in the letter is authoritative by 
way of incorporation.223 
The letter states in relevant part: 
The choice of law provision in the Security Deed was inserted with the 
expectation that enforcement of the mortgage loan would occur through 
a foreclosure action in which the Note reflecting the indebtedness and 
the Security Deed reflecting the security for repayment of that indebt-
edness would be considered together as an integrated contract and that 
the choice of law provision in the Security Deed would govern the en-
forcement of the Note. We intended that if a suit to enforce the Note 
were maintained separately from an action to foreclose on the property 
under the terms of the Security Deed, the applicable law would be de-
termined by the choice of law provisions of the forum jurisdiction.224 
The note and mortgage in question in Sims are the standard form Fannie/ 
Freddie “uniform instrument[s].”225 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “integrated contract” as “[o]ne or more 
writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agree-
ment.”226 The Fannie/Freddie Note necessarily incorporates the terms of the 
mortgage, as they must be read together as “a final expression.” Therefore, 
the obligations of the Fannie/Freddie Mortgage incorporated into the Fannie/ 
Freddie Note render the purported Fannie/Freddie Note nonnegotiable,227 
and a holder of the Fannie/Freddie Note cannot claim that it is entitled to 
enforce the note as the holder of a negotiable instrument.228 
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C. The Illinois Bankers Association Claims the Fannie/Freddie Note Must 
Be Deemed Negotiable Due to Far-Reaching Consequences If It Is 
Deemed Otherwise 
The Illinois Bankers Association (the “IBA”) is one of Illinois’s fore-
most government relations associations.229 As such, when the IBA speaks, 
government officials listen.230 The IBA represents banks of all sizes in Illi-
nois, initiates banker-supported legislation, lobbies in support of industry 
positions, testifies before legislative committees, and prepares and submits 
comprehensive comment letters on regulatory proposals.231 
In a recent letter to the Supreme Court Mortgage Foreclosure Committee, 
the IBA addressed certain “questions of first impression ... [the resolution of 
which] will have major practical and public policy consequences reaching far 
beyond the court room and defendants in foreclosure actions.”232 One such 
question of first impression the IBA references is the “argument[] asserting 
that many if not most mortgage notes which conform to the fixed require-
ments of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not negotiable instruments 
because they contain undertakings and conditions that disqualify them 
from the definition of ‘negotiable’ under Article 3 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.”233 
In the letter, the IBA does not discuss the veracity of the claim that the 
Fannie/Freddie Note is nonnegotiable.234 Instead, the IBA undertakes to in-
appropriately pressure the Committee into finding the Fannie/Freddie Note 
negotiable without any evidence to support said contention by stating that 
the individuals raising concerns about the negotiability of the Fannie/Freddie 
Note “apparently are not concerned with [the] implications beyond the con-
text of a given lawsuit or class of lawsuits, but the rest of us should be, for 
obvious reasons.”235 Interestingly enough, the IBA does not further eluci-
date what those obvious reasons are, in apparent fear of acknowledging the 
reality of the situation in writing.236 Instead, the IBA strongly implies that 
the Fannie/Freddie Note should be found negotiable due to the fact that 
“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together hold over $5.3 trillion in home 
mortgages, nearly half the entire residential mortgage market in the United 
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States.”237 Again, the IBA’s position offers no real legal support for the con-
tention that the Fannie/Freddie Note is actually negotiable. 
The IBA’s letter confirms that the world’s largest financial institutions 
recognize the problem with the negotiability of the Fannie/Freddie Note. 
However, rather than correcting this legal fiction and adjusting the form 
note and mortgage to comply with negotiability requirements, large finan-
cial institutions like the IBA hope to avoid this misstep on their part by 
intimidating the courts and legislature into believing that “the Emperor is 
wearing clothes.” 
Despite the fact that “Fannie and Freddie presently are issuing more than 
95% of all mortgage-backed securities in the country,”238 the Fannie/Freddie 
Note contains numerous promises in addition to the payment of money that 
are not authorized by article 3.239 The courts have too often let individuals 
and banking institutions who believe that “financial services professionals 
may need to engage in unethical or illegal conduct to be successful” off the 
hook.240 When courts continue to let banks escape accountability for their 
actions, they encourage the dangerous belief that these banks are above the 
law or too big to jail.241 
A large part of the courts’ willingness to overlook the banking institu-
tions’ failure to follow applicable law has stemmed from the underlying 
rationale that delinquent homeowners deserve to be foreclosed on.242 In this 
age of rampant fraud by such banking institutions, however, the courts are 
quickly changing their tune.243 More and more each day, our courts and 
justices are forcing themselves to look past their preconceived prejudices 
regarding defaulting borrowers in the pursuit of justice.244 As Justice 
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Schwartz declared in a recent Florida Third District Court of Appeal ruling 
involving a borrower who managed to stay in his home for fifteen years 
without payment after default, “[t]he law is the law. Notwithstanding the 
distasteful consequences of applying it ... , it must be served.”245 
IV. THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: HOW ARTICLE 9 AND BASIC 
CONTRACT LAW CAN REPLACE ARTICLE 3 AND MAINTAIN FLUIDITY 
OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET WHILE PROVIDING 
TRANSPARENCY AND PROTECTION TO CONSUMERS 
There is an obvious solution to the problem presented by this Article. 
As the authors opined in the Introduction, the largest problem with nego-
tiability is that there is no transparency to the transaction, and makers are left 
not knowing to whom their debt is owed. The holder in due course doctrine 
has left the uninformed and poorer sectors of the market with little recourse  
to open predatory lending practices and other immoral actions by loan origi-
nators. Furthermore, as Professor Eggert stated, case by case litigation favors 
the financial institutions as it is costly for consumers, and financial institu-
tions can act collectively to shape case law in their favor: 
Case by case litigation, on the other hand, [is] commonly too expensive 
for the poor consumers who [rely] on consumer credit, giving their lenders 
a tremendous advantage in litigation because the lenders [can] refuse to 
settle quickly and then wear down the consumers until the harried bor-
rowers either [drop] the suit or [agree] to terms favoring the lenders. Fur-
thermore, while each borrower [has] only his or her own loan to worry 
about, lenders, looking out for their long-term interests, [have] a greater 
incentive to fight for changes that [will] help them. One such strategy 
would be to settle as much as possible any cases with facts especially un-
favorable to lenders, while insisting on trying all cases with facts favor-
able to lenders. By trying such cases and participating in any appeals, 
the lenders could hope to shape favorable case law since it would be 
largely based on cases where the lenders appeared sympathetic or the 
borrowers unsympathetic.246 
Unfortunately, most courts side with lenders based on the incorrect belief 
that lenders are somehow the party more entitled to equity in foreclosure 
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actions, and often bend and break rules of procedure and rules of evidence 
in order to enter judgment in favor of a bank.247 
In fact, the authors of this Article have appeared before countless trial 
court judges who have engaged in conduct that is such an egregious viola-
tion of the law that it extends into malfeasance, rather than simple judicial 
error.248 Interestingly enough, other appellate judges besides Judge Schwartz 
have come out publicly in stating that the law must be applied equally re-
gardless of the consequences. One such appellate judge made it clear that 
“the law is not complicated;” and furthermore, that the law must be ap-
plied equally in all types of cases regardless of the outcome effected 
through its application. 
The problems of negotiability could be solved simply by removing the 
tenets of negotiability from real estate transactions and applying basic 
contract law and the provisions of article 9 of the UCC. Instead of transfer 
by endorsement, financial institutions would have to transfer by assign-
ment, which requires documents to be dated and notarized, thus providing 
additional procedural safeguards to consumers. As noted by Professor Neil 
Cohen in his article The Calamitous Law of Notes, most rules regarding 
transfer by endorsement and negotiability of instruments have become 
superfluous and could be easily achieved through basic contract law.249 In 
considering all of the various rules under article 3 of the UCC as analyzed 
in this Article, Professor Cohen noted: 
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All of the rules mentioned ... are important rules .... Nonetheless, for the 
most part, they are unnecessary rules. They are unnecessary because with 
the exception of the good title rules for holders in due course, they could 
all be created by contract whether or not the document evidencing the 
undertaking to pay qualifies as a note governed by Article 3 of the UCC. 
Thus, while the rules may be beneficial, they do not bring about results 
that could not be brought about, almost as simply, merely by careful 
drafting of the underlying contract.250 
In fact, parties can contractually agree to be subject to provisions iden-
tical to the holder in due course doctrine, including a waiver of personal de-
fenses. By containing such an express waiver of such rights in the terms of 
the contract between the parties, the obvious advantage to consumers is that 
they will be aware of the waiver of their rights to bring defenses, rather than 
being subjected to a waiver as the result of an obscure and outdated legal 
doctrine not even referenced in the documents they are signing. Thus, the 
only actual loss that would be suffered would be the good title to a note for 
a holder in due course, which has slight value in today’s global economy 
anyhow. Finally, making transfer occur by assignment would require lenders 
to record the transfer in interest from one lender to another, putting the 
borrower and the public on notice as to who the rightful beneficiary of the 
contract is, again lending transparency and accountability to financial institu-
tions. Although Mortgage Electronic Recordation Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) 
arguably tries to do that, it is privately owned and not independent, as it is 
a registry owned and controlled by the banks (as an internal recordation 
system) and has been largely discredited by the robo-signing scandal. 
CONCLUSION 
The remarkable shift in the use of negotiable instruments, and particularly 
the promissory note, from the late seventeenth century to today exempli-
fies the need to correct the current system and offer more protection to con-
sumers. The crash of the real estate housing market, which had artificially 
ballooned due to predatory lending practices, over inflation of property val-
ues, and rampant abuse of the public by financial institutions has shone a 
light on the flaws in our system and the lack of oversight of financial institu-
tions that were permitted to run amuck during times of prosperity. While 
the FTC saw fit to do away with the holder in due course doctrine by promul-
gating its Rule with relation to retail installment contracts, the very reasons 
for that action still exist in the real property lending sector, and the same 
abuses which the FTC sought to prevent still exist in an area where the 
stakes are exponentially greater, and the damage limitless. 
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As practicing attorneys in the area of foreclosure defense, the authors 
of this Article have seen constant abuse by financial institutions against con-
sumers. The authors have also seen a judiciary too overburdened and lack-
ing in resources to address these problems, facing constant political pressure 
to clear a backlog that was created not by consumers, but by the very finan-
cial institutions that now seek equity and redress in their courtrooms. The 
authors have seen a judiciary that is afraid of its legislative counterpart, which 
is controlled by funding and legislative directives despite the fact that these 
branches are supposed to be “equals,” and more importantly are supposed 
to be governed by the separation of powers. Finally, the authors have seen a 
judiciary that, at least at the trial court level, engages in systemic favoritism 
of lenders, making it difficult if not impossible for borrowers to mount a 
legitimate defense. 
Financial institutions wave the “holder in due course doctrine” like a 
mantra, using it to try and defeat claims against every inequitable course of 
action they have taken, every fraud they have perpetrated, and every Fore-
closuregate scandal that they have caused. They hide behind it like an im-
penetrable wall, the fortress that protects them from public outcry and 
Occupy Wall Street protestors sick of being abused by financial institutions 
who are “too big to fail, too big to jail, and too big to nail.” If courts were 
to finally open their eyes, determine that these promissory notes are not 
negotiable instruments, and apply contract law to these cases, true justice 
might actually be achieved and the interest of our judicial system will be 
preserved. It is for this very reason those financial institutions and their lobby-
ists, such as the Illinois Bankers Association, are fighting tooth and nail to 
make sure this does not happen. It is for those same reasons, however, that 
it must be done. As stated so aptly by Judge Leventhal, “the law must not 
yield to expediency and the convenience of lending institutions.”251 There-
fore, the authors of this Article call on the judiciary to uphold the law rather 
than lore, to force transparency into the mortgage note realm, and protect 
the interests of the legal system by acknowledging finally that the emperor 
needs a new wardrobe. 
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